Background and Objective: Lack of awareness about impairments is commonly found in Alzheimer disease (AD), but recent evidence suggests that patients may respond to the experience of illness despite limited awareness. In this study, we explored whether implicit emotional responses to experiences of failure in cognitive tasks would result in longer-term change in behavior.
Background and Objective: Lack of awareness about impairments is commonly found in Alzheimer disease (AD), but recent evidence suggests that patients may respond to the experience of illness despite limited awareness. In this study, we explored whether implicit emotional responses to experiences of failure in cognitive tasks would result in longer-term change in behavior.
Methods: Twenty-two patients with AD were seen 1 week after a previous session in which they performed computer tasks that had been manipulated to be either too difficult (failure condition) or very easy (success condition) for them. At the second session, both types of tasks were set to have medium difficulty and were administered so that the participants decided how long to persist on each task. Task persistence was determined by relative time spent doing the tasks, considering that participants would be more likely to stop performing tasks in which they had experienced failure during the first session.
Results: Task persistence in the second session was not affected by performance in the first session. However, when participants' awareness of performance in the first session was taken into account, differences were found in persistence between tasks in the second session. During the second session, participants stopped performing tasks after a sequence of errors. There were no self-reported changes in motivation or enjoyment in response to task failure.
Conclusions: These findings suggest that implicit learning of task valence may be compromised in AD, but that initial moments of awareness of performance may influence long-term adaptation in unaware patients.
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P eople with Alzheimer disease (AD) commonly lack awareness about their illness, cognitive impairments, or reduced neuropsychological performance (Mograbi et al, 2012b; Rosen, 2011; Starkstein et al, 2007) . The term anosognosia, originally coined by Babinski (1914) to describe impaired self-awareness resulting from damage to brain structures, is an appropriate label for these phenomena in AD. The most obvious cause of this deficit in AD is neurobiological, but other factors, such as psychosocial influences like premorbid personality and social context, may also play a role (Clare, 2004) . Even though people with AD may lack explicit awareness of their condition, recent studies have shown that they are capable of responding to the experience of illness. This has been observed in terms of emotional reactivity to memoryrelated words in a Stroop paradigm (Martyr et al, 2011) and normal emotional reaction to task failure (Mograbi et al, 2012a) . Similar findings were reported in anosognosia for hemiplegia Nardone et al, 2007) and psychosis (Beck et al, 2004) . Such phenomena constitute what has been termed implicit awareness (see Mograbi and Morris, 2013) .
The concept of implicit awareness suggests behavioral adaptation to illness despite unawareness of deficits, something that has been found in clinical observations Orfei et al, 2007) . For example, patients with hemiplegia may avoid activities that rely on use of both hands despite being anosognosic about their paralysis (Bisiach and Geminiani, 1991; Cocchini et al, 2018) . They may also refuse to acknowledge problems, despite complying with treatment, for example, by remaining in the hospital to receive care (Prigatano and Weinstein, 1996) or by staying in bed or using a wheelchair (Bisiach and Berti, 1995) . Behavioral adaptation despite limited awareness may be used as an important treatment tool, for example, to foster patient adherence. However, only a few experimental studies have explored this topic. Their findings suggest that some patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia show motor adjustment to their condition, for example, by performing actions that could be done with either one or two hands in a manner consistent with their paralysis (Cocchini et al, 2010; Moro et al, 2011) .
With regard to AD, some clinical observations of patients have noted an adjustment to condition (eg, increased calendar use) despite unawareness of impairments . Experimental evidence, however, is sparse. One study by Moulin et al (2000) using word lists showed that although people with AD were inaccurate in their prediction of memory performance in terms of verbal judgments, they nevertheless allocated their study time appropriately in relation to the actual performance. Cotrell and Wild (1999) suggested that patients with AD may implement voluntary and self-initiated restrictions on driving in response to their impairments, and that this behavior is not especially associated with awareness of cognitive deficits. It is possible that such changes in behavior are caused by residual or fluctuating awareness, but in view of how patients sometimes rationalize behavioral change, it seems likely that implicit adaptation may be partially related to this phenomenon.
Furthermore, descriptive studies have suggested the presence of implicit learning in cases of patients presenting with amnesia for declarative memory in spite of limited awareness of their capacity (Schacter, 1990 (Schacter, , 1992 . This capacity seemed to extend to affective content of stimuli. Claparede (1911) illustrated this point by using a pin to prick the hand of a patient with dense anterograde amnesia while shaking hands with him. The next day the patient did not remember the events of the day before or Claparede himself, but nevertheless refused to shake his hand. When asked why, the patient gave an explanation unrelated to the previous day's experience. Supporting this report and the idea of affective learning in spite of declarative memory deficits, Tranel and Damasio (1993) described the case of a man with severe anterograde amnesia for all types of knowledge, including faces, who formed bonds with new people differently depending on the affective valence they exhibited. For example, although unable to recognize faces, the patient would choose, in a forced-choice paradigm, the face of an experimenter who had displayed positive affect toward him in preference to another who had displayed negative affect. This implicit learning dissipated with time, however, and at a 4-year follow-up the patient responded indiscriminately to the faces. Implicit learning of affective valence has long been studied with amnesic patients using conditioning paradigms, and studies suggest that this learning is preserved even in profoundly amnesic patients (Weiskrantz and Warrington, 1979; see Woodruff-Pak, 1993 , for a study with patient H.M.). More recently, it has been shown that people with AD experience prolonged states of emotion that persist beyond their declarative memory of exposure to emotional material (GuzmanVelez et al, 2014) .
Though scant, such data suggest an implicit processing of information about illness and failure in tasks that leads to emotional responses and behavioral change. These findings are consistent with the Cognitive Awareness Model, developed to explain different phenomena associated with anosognosia in AD (Agnew and Morris, 1998; Mograbi and Morris, 2014; Morris and Hannesdottir, 2004; Morris and Mograbi, 2013) . This model postulates that anosognosia is heterogeneous, with potential executive (eg, error-monitoring deficits) or mnemonic (eg, lack of updating of personal information) presentations. Nevertheless, the model also suggests that the presence of relatively well preserved mechanisms for error detection allows information about deficits or condition to be relayed to a parallel implicit route that bypasses consciousness, resulting in affective and behavioral regulation in the absence of metacognition.
This idea was explored experimentally in a study (Mograbi et al, 2012a ) that investigated emotional reactivity in response to performance on computerized memory or reaction time tasks in which difficulty levels were manipulated to make them either very easy or frustratingly hard for each participant. These were designated, respectively, as "success" and "failure" conditions. An AD group showed lack of awareness about performance relative to controls. However, the two groups showed similar emotional reactivity as measured by self-report and filming of facial expressions, with equally pronounced negative emotional expressions during the failure condition. These findings suggest that the AD group processed the affective valence of the failure experience even though their awareness of performance was impaired. This indicates a dissociation of implicit processing of information and awareness (for studies showing that emotional features of stimuli modulate awareness, see Bertrand et al, 2016; Besharati et al, 2015; D'Imperio et al, 2017) .
In this study, we explored whether implicit emotional responses to experiences of failure would result in longer-term change in behavior, as suggested by previous everyday observations but not yet studied experimentally. Would the AD group in the study by Mograbi et al (2012a) show relative changes in their future response to the "success" or "failure" condition tasks, despite their limited awareness of performance?
To investigate this question, we saw the AD participants who participated in the previous study after 1 week and again administered the tasks. The previously "easy" or "difficult" tasks were now both set at medium difficulty and were administered so that the participants decided how long to persist on each one. The level of task persistence associated with failure was determined by comparing time spent doing the tasks, with the idea that participants would be more likely to stop a task if they had experienced failure on it in the first session. Such behavior would suggest implicit affective learning. In addition, we measured self-reported task motivation and enjoyment, with the idea that a previous experience of failure could adversely affect these variables. (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) . In addition, patients were included if they had MiniMental State Examination (Folstein et al, 1975 ) scores of at least 18 (Mungas, 1991; National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2006) .
METHODS Participants
Consecutive patients who fulfilled the study eligibility criteria were approached. We excluded those with a current neurologic disorder other than AD (patients with mixed AD and vascular dementia were also excluded), history of head injury resulting in loss of consciousness for more than 1 hour, history of alcohol or substance abuse (based on International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision, criteria), history of diagnosed psychiatric disorder, or current comorbidity. Table 1 lists the clinical and demographic characteristics of the participants.
The project was approved by the South London and Maudsley/Institute of Psychiatry Ethics Committee (Research Ethics Committee number 08/H0807/6). All participants provided written informed consent, with caregivers also giving their agreement for the patient to take part.
Procedures

Overview
Two success-failure manipulation computerized paradigms were used to measure reaction time and memory, respectively, with each test having two alternative but distinctive versions. For full details about the study and the development of the success-failure manipulation tasks, see Mograbi et al (2012a . The study consisted of two sessions. Results from the first session, which compared patients with AD and controls, indicated that the patients showed poorer awareness of performance than controls but still preserved emotional reactivity to failure (Mograbi et al, 2012a) .
The focus of the present report is on task persistence in the second session. Because task persistence is related to failure in the first session, we here describe the configuration of the computer tasks for both sessions.
First Session: Titration and Success-Failure Manipulation. We used a titration technique to match task difficulty across participants. The ability of each participant was first established individually by systematically increasing difficulty levels until consistent failure occurred. The participants then went on to a success-failure manipulation phase in which success or failure conditions were established by setting the difficulty level below or above, respectively, this performance threshold. For each participant, one of the alternative versions of each of the two types of task was set with a threshold that led to a high level of task failure, and the other was set at a threshold that led to a high level of success. Participants were not informed that levels of difficulty would be manipulated, and the manipulations were disguised successfully (for details, see Mograbi et al, 2012a) .
Second Session: Titration and Persistence Evaluation. After 1 week, the same tasks were again administered to the AD group. The 1-week time gap was chosen based on pilot testing of the software using four patients with AD, the results of which indicated that patients would have no recollection of task performance after a week's time . After performing the practice trials in the second session, the four patients were asked if they were familiar with this task. Two patients had no recollection of the previous testing, and two had a feeling of familiarity but were unable to describe their previous performance.
For the second session, the difficulty level was determined by repeating the titration procedure, taking into account potential variation in performance between sessions due to factors such as practice effect. After the titration, all tasks were set at a 50% level of performance: success-failure manipulation computer software controlled difficulty levels over a block of trials arranged in a pseudo-random order, with five trials below and five trials above the participant's success threshold in each. This overall approach was designed so that the task was difficult enough to motivate the participant to continue, but not so easy as to mask any prior experience persistence effect. The tasks were presented in the same order as in the first session, as described by Mograbi et al (2012a) , with the order of experiments and conditions being quasi-counterbalanced between the participants as described previously (Mograbi et al, 2012a) . For the sake of simplicity, tasks in the second session are referred to by their condition in the first session (success or failure), even though in the second session these tasks were set up to have the same level of success.
Experiments
In both experiments, parallel versions of the tasks, made distinctive by nonessential task features, were used, avoiding task-related effects on motivation. These are described below.
Experiment 1: Reaction Time. In version 1 of the reaction time task, a car appears on a computer screen moving across the screen from left to right. The participant has to "stop" the car as soon as it appears by pressing a single centrally located box-housed button. If it is pressed, a "traffic warden" appears and there is a "clink" noise. In version 2 of the task, objects (eg, ball, egg, or vase) appear to fall from the top of a building. The participant has to "catch" the object by pressing the button as soon as the object appears. Success is signified by a "hand" appearing to catch the object, and the same "clink" noise. For both versions a warning tone sounds and after 164 milliseconds the object appears. If the participant fails to respond in time (before the car or object disappears from the screen), a "croak" noise signals failure. The practice trials ensured that the patients understood the meaning of the auditory feedback. Participants were told not to press the button before they saw the target or between trials. Task difficulty overall was manipulated by varying the object's speed, quantified by pixels moved per screen refresh, from 12 (slowest) to 42 (fastest).
Experiment 2: Memory. Memory span test procedures also used material presented on a computer screen. For version 1, pictures of one to ten identical everyday objects (eg, alarm clocks, baskets) are displayed scattered across the screen. For each trial the objects are highlighted in a random sequence using a red square surround, and immediately afterward the participant has to point to the same objects in sequence. For version 2, the participant listens to the experimenter read a sequence of digits ranging from zero to nine, which are shown one at a time in the center of the screen. The participant then immediately repeats the numbers in the same sequence to the experimenter. For both versions, completely correct responses are indicated by a green visual "tick" and an auditory "clink," and failure by a red cross and a "croak" sound. The shortest sequence of objects or digits was one and the longest was ten.
Measures Figure 1 shows the order of procedures and assessments.
Task Persistence
Persistence was measured by how long participants performed each task during the persistence phase of the second session. In this session, the computer tasks had no time limit and patients were instructed that they could stop the task whenever they liked. They were told, "Do this task for as long as you want, there is no expected minimum amount of time; it is really up to you." The time was recorded from the end of the titration phase to the point at which the participant stopped performing the task. However, on three occasions, participants asked to stop the task before the end of the titration phase, and for these people their persistence time was considered to be 0 seconds. Because of the possibility that the patients would Filming of facial expressions OJD FIGURE 1. Protocol for Experiment 1 (reaction time tasks) and Experiment 2 (memory tasks). For Experiment 1, the titration phase continued until the participant made three consecutive mistakes; for Experiment 2, it was two consecutive mistakes. This was followed by a phase of initial success, in which the tasks were easy, and then by the experimental conditions (success or failure). In Session 1, the order of tasks and assignment of task version to condition was counterbalanced, with the constraint that participants never did two failure condition tasks consecutively. The order of tasks in Session 2 was the same as in Session 1 for all participants. OJD = objective-judgment discrepancy.
forget the instruction to stop when they wanted to, they were prompted again with the instructions 1 minute after the start of the persistence phase, and every 4 minutes thereafter.
Self-reported Motivation and Enjoyment
A 4-point scale was used to rate motivation and enjoyment corresponding with each computer task: 0 = "not at all," 1 = "a little," 2 = "somewhat," 3 = "a lot." During the first session, ratings were obtained immediately after the practice trials but before starting the titration phase, when the participants were already familiar with the task demands. The participants were asked, "How motivated are you to do this task, from not at all to a lot?" and "How do you think you will enjoy doing this task, from not at all to a lot?" Further explanation was given if needed. Additionally, because answers to these questions could be influenced by demand characteristics (ie, the participants' attempt to comply with the supposed experimental purpose), participants were told after each question and before their response, "Please answer honestly, if you think you are not motivated or will not enjoy it, you can say this. It is not a problem." Participants were asked the same questions in the second session, again immediately after practice trials but before starting the titration phase. The investigator also rated participants' apparent motivation and enjoyment. These ratings were completed immediately after the self-rating procedure and used the same 4-point scale. The investigator's rating took into consideration not only the oral response of participants but also other revealing details such as tone of voice, speed of response, and facial expression.
Other Measures
Awareness of performance was not measured in the second session, as it was not the focus of the study. Nevertheless, during the first session an objective-judgment discrepancy (OJD) (Agnew and Morris, 1998) method had been used to measure awareness of performance. Immediately after the success or failure condition, participants were asked to rate how well they did on the task, using a rating scale of 0% to 100%, with 0% indicating that all trials were wrong and 100% that all trials were correct. Actual performance was subtracted from estimated ratings to create the OJD score, with positive results indicating overestimation of performance.
Emotional reactivity was also measured in the first session (see Mograbi et al, 2012a , for more details). In summary, participants completed a self-report questionnaire measuring four emotional dimensions (frustration, disappointment, embarrassment, and boredom), which were combined to produce a general index of negative or positive self-reported emotion. In addition, facial expressions were filmed and rated using the Facial Action Coding System (Ekman and Friesen, 1978) .
Unawareness about the dementia condition in general was also measured in the sample with the Anosognosia Questionnaire for Dementia (Migliorelli et al, 1995) . This instrument relies on direct questioning of patient and informant, contrasting their answers to questions covering functional and behavioral problems commonly found during the course of dementia. Finally, use of the Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer's Disease word list memory task generated scores for immediate recall, delayed recall, recognition, and number of intrusions (Morris et al, 1989) .
Statistical Analysis
All analyses were performed separately for each experiment. To ensure that the experimental manipulation succeeded, a 2×2 repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated, with task type (success and failure) and session (first and second) as within-subject factors. To explore persistence in relation to task type, a one-tailed paired-samples t test was calculated to compare the time spent between the tasks that had been used previously in either success or failure conditions. These tests were recalculated as analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) to allow the inclusion of covariates, with exploration of their impact on differences in persistence on success and failure condition tasks. Because of limited statistical power, only one covariate was included per analysis.
A total of nine ANCOVAs were calculated, including one of the following variables as a covariate: cognitive level (Mini-Mental State Examination), awareness of condition (Anosognosia Questionnaire for Dementia), delayed recall (taken from the Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer's Disease test), emotional reactivity in the first session (intensity of facial expressions, repertoire of facial expressions, and self-reported emotion), and awareness of task performance in the first session (OJD scores for success and failure condition tasks). Cognitive level and awareness about condition were included because these general factors could be linked to decreased persistence. Delayed recall was included because better memory could result in explicit recall of the first session, influencing task persistence in the second session. The influence of emotional reactivity was explored because stronger reactions in the first session could predict more pronounced avoidance of tasks subsequently. Finally, the aim of analyzing the relationship of persistence with task awareness (OJD) was to determine whether changes in persistence were associated with perception of performance in the first session (ie, encoding how well they actually did in the task).
We calculated the influence of failure during the tasks in the second session as a complementary analysis because even though overall performance in the second session was controlled at 50%, this was done with a block of ten trials (five failure and five success) coming in random order. During the testing patients would frequently stop the tasks after a sequence of trial failures. In order to test this response pattern statistically, the number of errors in the last three trials before participants stopped was recorded, and a one-sample t test against the expected mean of 1.5 failures (equal number of errors and correct answers) was calculated. This was done to explore whether participants were sensitive to errors in the second session and whether this could be a potential explanation for their stopping the tasks.
Finally, to investigate whether the change in motivation and enjoyment from the first to the second session was significantly different for the previous failure condition task compared with the previous success condition task, a motivation and enjoyment change score was created (for both self-report and investigator ratings). It was calculated as follows: change in second session equals motivation and/or enjoyment at start of second session minus motivation and/or enjoyment at start of first session. These two scores (change for success versus change for failure task) were then compared using a Wilcoxon signed rank test (Wilcoxon, 1947) . This analysis was structurally equivalent to a parametric two-way ANOVA with time and condition as factors. In this analysis, to account for the effect of multiple testing, P-values were adjusted by Bonferroni-Hochberg corrections (Hochberg, 1988) within each experiment. For all analyses, α was set at 0.05.
RESULTS
Data from the first session, reported in Mograbi et al (2012a) , provide important context for the current study, particularly regarding the effectiveness of the successfailure manipulation. We therefore summarize those earlier reported results here. Table 2 presents patients' awareness of performance (OJD score) in the first session and their actual performance in both the first and second sessions. There was a significant interaction between session and performance (F 1,20 = 90.75, P < 0.001). The experimental manipulation led to markedly different performances in the first session (P < 0.001), but, by design, not in the second session (P = 0.663). In the first session, AD patients seemed to underestimate their performance in the success condition and overestimate it in the failure condition.
Experiment 1: Reaction Time
Persistence
A one-tailed paired-samples t test indicated no significant differences in the persistence time when comparing the conditions (t 21 = 0.99, P = 0.167; Figure 2) . The above analysis was repeated using ANCOVA to allow the inclusion of covariates. We found no change in results after controlling for cognitive level, awareness about condition, emotional reactivity, delayed recall, or awareness of performance of the failure condition reaction time task in the first session. The difference in time spent doing the tasks in the second session became significant after controlling for awareness of performance (OJD score) of the success condition reaction time task in the first session (F 1,20 = 6.53, P = 0.019). There was also an interaction with this factor (F 1,20 = 5.50, P = 0.029), with more time in the second session spent doing the success condition task but less doing the failure condition task with increased awareness of the success condition task in the first session (success condition task B = 2.14; failure condition task B = −3.40).
Numbers of Errors Before Stopping
In the last three trials before participants stopped the tasks, they had an average of 2.18 (standard deviation = 0.96) errors in the success condition task and 2.04 (standard deviation = 1.00) in the failure condition task. A one-sample t test indicated that these values were significantly above an expected mean of 1.5 errors (success condition task: t 21 = 3.34, P = 0.003; failure condition task: t 21 = 2.56, P = 0.018).
Motivation and Enjoyment
Table 3 presents summary data for motivation and enjoyment before tasks in each session. Wilcoxon tests revealed no significant differences between changes in scores regardless of outcome and rating method (self-rated motivation: z = −0.83, P = 0.999; self-rated enjoyment: z = −0.09, P = 0.999; investigator-rated motivation: z = 0.00, P = 0.999; investigator-rated enjoyment: z = −1.16, P = 0.976). Table 4 presents patients' awareness of performance (OJD score) in the first session and actual performance in the first and second sessions. There was a significant interaction between session and performance (F 1,20 = 45.42, P < 0.001). In agreement with the experimental manipulation, there were significant differences in performance in the first session (P < 0.001), but not in the second session (P = 0.775). Patients showed a swing in estimations of performance similar to that observed during Experiment 1, but with higher scores (for a full discussion and comparison with control data, see Mograbi et al, 2012a) .
Experiment 2: Memory
Persistence
A one-tailed paired-samples t test indicated no significant differences in the time spent doing tasks in the two conditions (t 21 = 1.49, P = 0.075; Figure 2 ). Using ANCOVA (Mograbi et al, 2012b ). NA = not assessed. OJD = objective-judgment discrepancy. and controlling for cognitive level, awareness about condition, emotional reactivity, or delayed recall, we found that the results were unchanged, but there were changes when awareness of performance in the first session was included as a covariate. After controlling for awareness of performance of the failure condition memory task in the first session, we found a significant difference between times spent on tasks (F 1,20 = 5.63, P = 0.028) (success condition task B = 3.36; failure condition task B = −4.83). There was also a significant difference after controlling for awareness of performance of the success condition memory task in the first session (F 1,20 = 9.36, P = 0.006). In addition, there was an interaction with this factor (F 1,20 = 6.55, P = 0.019), with more time spent in the second session doing the success condition task but less time spent doing the failure condition task with increased awareness of the success condition task in the first session (success condition task B = 6.61; failure condition task B = −2.63).
Numbers of Errors Before Stopping
In the last three trials before participants stopped the tasks, they had an average of 2.00 (standard deviation = 0.62) errors in the success condition task and 1.95 (standard deviation = 0.84) in the failure condition task.
A one-sample t test indicated that these values were significantly above an expected mean of 1.5 errors (success condition task: t 21 = 3.80, P = 0.001; failure condition task: t 21 = 2.53, P = 0.019).
Motivation and Enjoyment
Table 5 presents summary data for motivation and enjoyment before the memory tasks in each session. There were no significant differences between changes in scores regardless of outcome and rating method (self-rated motivation: z = −0.06, P = 0.999; self-rated enjoyment: z = −0.28, P = 0.999; investigator-rated motivation: z = 0.25, P = 0.999; investigator-rated enjoyment: z = −0.85, P = 0.999).
DISCUSSION
Contrary to our study's main hypothesis, we found no differences in patients' persistence a week after performing a series of tasks with varied degrees of success. However, when awareness of performance in the first session was used as a covariate, results showed less persistence on the task associated with worst performance in the first session. Participants also showed a propensity to give up after failure in the second session. For self-or FIGURE 2. Mean time spent doing reaction time tasks during Experiment 1 and memory tasks during Experiment 2 in the success and failure conditions. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. There was no significant difference between the two conditions in either experiment. investigator-rated motivation and enjoyment, there were no differences in changes between success and failure tasks from the first to the second session.
Persistence
In both experiments, there were no significant differences in persistence for success relative to failure condition tasks. Means were in the predicted direction, but high variability meant the results were not significant. Nevertheless, the effect sizes were small (Cohen's d = 0.16 and 0.31 for reaction time and memory tasks, respectively). The rationale behind our use of distinctive tasks in opposite conditions was that patients would associate each task with relative success or failure in the first session, and, based on this experience, exhibit task preference in the second session. The hypothesis of task preference in AD was based on anecdotal evidence, but the lack of such an effect is not entirely surprising given that associative learning processes, such as classical conditioning, have been found to be impaired in AD (Hoefer et al, 2008; Woodruff-Pak et al, 1996) . However, it is not clear whether deficits in conditioning in AD are due mainly to impaired response to unconditioned stimuli or to a specific impairment in learning mechanisms (Hamann et al, 2002) . In a previous study, AD patients were able to exhibit emotional responses to these tasks (Mograbi et al, 2012a) ; thus it seems that the lack of significant differences in task persistence in the second session may be attributed to impairments specific to learning.
An important finding related to understanding behavioral change was the association of awareness of task performance in the first session with persistence in the second session, with better awareness predicting more persistence later on. This result was consistent for awareness of success for both experiments, and also present for failure in the memory tasks. The fact that this result was stronger for awareness of success condition tasks may suggest that, rather than being a case of task avoidance, this effect would be more aptly described as an increase in persistence following success. While this finding is initially counterintuitive, as it might suggest that acquired implicit response to failure depends on awareness, there are various ways of explaining it.
Awareness provides a stimulus with wider contextual linking and correlational abilities. In other words, when we are aware of something, we become aware of its relationship with other things (Weiskrantz, 1997) . One possible explanation of why initial awareness was associated with long-term behavioral change is the complexity of the learning involved. Learning the valence of the computer tasks is arguably more complex than basic implicit learning, such as in classical conditioning. For example, knowledge about emotional states caused by the tasks involves an attributional level, which may be more fully accessed with awareness. According to this perspective, awareness would be needed to integrate information fully, creating a "global workspace" in which different sources of information (eg, cognitive, emotional, behavioral) are linked (Baars, 1997) . It is also possible that the experience of initial failure with awareness has a longer-lasting consequence on behavior than that without it; this may be particularly important for cases in which subsequent explicit recollection of stimulus properties is not possible. Perhaps with shorter time gaps, initial awareness would not be such a relevant factor. Here the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness may prove relevant (Block, 1995) . Although the immediate experience of failure (ie, phenomenal consciousness) may lead to shortterm adaptation, only an initial moment of reasoning and cognitive control (ie, access consciousness) would lead to long-term behavioral change. Finally, it is also probable that the emotional impact of the tasks was not strong enough to cause long-term implicit learning on its own, and richer encoding of experience was necessary, even if this information subsequently degraded and led to impaired recollection of previous contact with the tasks. Whatever the case may be, this study shows that patients are capable of exhibiting long-term avoidance of tasks on which they had performed poorly, even without having memory of previous performance, given that those patients were aware of their initial task performance. That is, once the information is acquired and processed within awareness, with widespread linking and improved appraisal of contextual cues, it exerts implicit effects on behavior even if explicit memory of the tasks is unavailable. This may be particularly important from a clinical point of view, highlighting the need to provide information about ability to patients with awareness in order for long-term adaptation in relation to treatment to occur.
Number of Errors Before Stopping the Tasks
In both experiments participants consistently stopped the tasks after a sequence of trial failures, at a level significantly above chance. For both experiments, the number of errors before stopping is higher for tasks in which AD patients previously succeeded, although this is a nonsignificant marginal difference. It is possible that the effects of previous performance are more evident in a context of failure, and perhaps if tasks had been set up for failure instead of being neutral (ie, 50% success) in the second session, more marked differences in task avoidance would have been evident. In any case, this finding suggests that AD patients' task avoidance was also influenced by performance in the second session, with failures leading to giving up on the task (ie, less persistence). Even though awareness of performance in the second session was not measured, the observed behavior may indicate that patients are able to monitor their performance at least on a trial-bytrial basis, and that successive experience of failure decreases task persistence in AD, consistent with the study's hypothesis. This is also in agreement with previous studies on metacognition in AD, which indicate that patients can revise estimations of performance following feedback, but that after a delay this information degrades and estimations revert to pretesting levels (Ansell and Bucks, 2006; Souchay, 2007; Stewart et al, 2010) . This seems to suggest that unawareness in the current sample may be caused more by a problem of integration and consolidation of information than by deficits in error processing. This highlights, clinically, how patients may be able to respond to feedback about performance, at least in the short term.
Enjoyment and Motivation Ratings
Comparison of pretesting motivation and enjoyment ratings from the first and second sessions indicated no significant differences regardless of experiment and rating type (self-or investigator-reported). Data in Tables 2 and  3 indicate a trend toward reversion of AD patients' ratings in the second session to the pretesting levels of the first session. This suggests that, at least at an explicit/ declarative level, patients did not exhibit any long-term changes in motivation or enjoyment in response to the initial experience of failure.
Limitations
By design, the current study, focusing on the second session of testing, had no formal measures of the participants' memory of the first session. We did not want to risk biasing the participants' expectations concerning the nature of this study. Also, we took into account the findings of a pilot study that had shown that patients with similar levels of neuropsychological impairment were clearly unable to remember the tasks or their performance after a 1-week gap in testing. In the study reported here, only one participant spontaneously expressed a vague feeling of familiarity with the tasks but was unable to provide details about performance, and his scores in the second session were in no way atypical. Moreover, ANCOVA including performance in a memory test did not indicate an influence of this factor in task persistence. Measures of executive functions, particularly perseverance, would have been useful and could be employed in future investigations of implicit behavioral change in AD.
The current study did not have a control group, again based on the converse idea that the controls would remember task performance in a second session 1 week after the first and so the study would not be measuring implicit adaptation in this group. Further studies would be of interest using these procedures with very long time intervals for control participants, sufficient to cause forgetting of the task experience. Finally, the sample studied was limited in terms of both the heterogeneity of cognitive impairment and actual size, which could have contributed to the null finding when comparing persistence between success and failure. Nevertheless, as indicated above, the effect sizes obtained were small, such that if there were differences for this patient type, it might be that only much larger samples would deliver significant results.
In conclusion, these results indicate that experience of failure influenced persistence, and that implicit task avoidance can occur 1 week after exposure to failure, but that this is related to the degree of initial awareness of performance. These findings suggest that initial awareness may influence long-term adaptation. In the context of AD, in which variations of preserved awareness or monitoring of task performance are present, the extent of preservation may play an important role in adaptation, even if memory of experience of tasks is lost. Future studies are needed to expand knowledge about implicit behavioral change in AD.
